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JOHN A. 
v. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
*"'k•k**** 
BECK, ) 
) 
Plaintiff ) 
and Appellant, ) 
) 
) 
) 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
ON APPEAL 
TONY cox, Director ) 
Drivers License ) 
Division of the ) Case No. 15795 
State of Utah, ) 
) 
Defendant ) 
and Responde:-it. ) 
_,_ ~·~ ~~ .c 
_,_ 
-·-
* 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Order of the Third Judic-
ial District Court In And For Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
the HONORABLE PETER F. LEARY, Judge presiding. As a result 
of a trial held on March 7, 1978, the Court found that the 
Appellant refused to submit to a chemical test pursuant to 
Section 41-6-44.10, Utah Code Annotated, (1953, as amended). 
(Record, 23-24). The case was heard by the Court without 
a jury. 
The issue on appeal involves the interpretation of 
Section 41-6-44.10, as amended by the 1977 Utah State Leg-
islaturP.. 
- 1 -
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DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
The '.:1lird Judicial District Court after non-
jury trial entered an Order upholding the decision 
of the Drivers License Division that Appellant re-
fused to submit to a chemical test, resulting in a 
revocation of his driver's license. The trial was 
held pursuant to Section 41-6-44.10, Utah Code 
Annotated, (1953, as amended), authorizing a de 
novo review of the findings of the Department of 
~".otor Vehicles. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant seeks a reversal of the Third 
Judicial District Court decision, and a permanent 
reinstatement of his driving privileges. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 8, 1977, John Beck and his wife were 
at Little America Restaurant for the purpose of having 
dinner. (Record, 31) . They discovered that they had left 
their checkbook at Lhe motel where they were staying on 
North West Temple. Appellant left his wife at the rest-
aurant and went to get the checkbook. (Record, 32). 
At approximately the interse'ction of Second South 
and Third Pest, Salt Lake City, Utah, he was pulled over by 
police officers. (Record, 32, 46-67). Officer Mark, the 
arresting officer, observed the automobile making a right 
hand turn and not returning to the right hand lane of tra-
ffic. (Record, 46-47). He also observed him holding onto 
the door of his car, apparently for support, and smelled 
an odor of alcohol. (Record, 53). Officer Mark also 
believed that Mr. Beck's speech was slurred, but later 
admitted that Mr. Beck speaks like that all of the time. 
(Record, 54) . 
Field sobriety tests were administered. Th.erecord 
contains no evidence that the results of that test indicated 
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a state of intoxication. (Record, 18-19, 47-48). Never-
theless, he was placed under arrest for driving under the 
influence of alcohol. (Record, 12, 48-49). 
Upon being placed under arrest, Mr. Beck was very 
upset and hostile. (Record, 34, 50-51). Officer Mark 
asked him if he would submit to a test. His rights were 
read to him. Mr. Beck replied "I'm a criminal; yeah, yeah, 1 
yeah, I'm a criminal." When asked if he wanted to take the 
test, Er. Beck replied, "I don't know." (Record 36, 49-50) .. 
Officer Mark testified that he asked Mr. Beck to 
submit to a breathalyzer test on these occasions before ar-
riving at the jail, and one time at the jail. (Record, 50). 
He testified that he read the statutory warning once and 
explained, "the implied consent statute" to Mr. Beck in 
his own words twice. (Record, 50). On at least two (2) 
occasions, Mr. Beck replied, "I don't know", and the other 
times said nothing. (Record, 34, 50). 
At no time was Mr. Beck taken to the breathalyzer 
machine for the purpose of administering the test. (Record, 
36, 50). 
Mr. Beck testified that he was upset at the officers 
for arresting him, but at no time intended not to take the 
test. He believed the test would be administered after bein~ 
booked into jail. (Record, 36, 38). 
-4-
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booking desk that he had not yet had a breath test and 
advised Larry Bench of Pre-trial Services of the same 
fact. (Record, 36-37, 57-58). 
Mr. Beck has just moved to Utah, having lived 
in the State of California for Twenty-three (23) years. 
He believed, based upon publicity and talking to friends 
in the State of California, that the tests were to be 
administered by a chemist at booking. He believed that 
a refusal to take such a test would be.signified by sign-
ing a statement of refusal. (Record, 37,38). He became un-
cooperative with the officers after feeling he had passed 
the field sobriety tests, but nevertheless being arrested. 
(Record, 40). He believed that he would be given the test 
and that he could make the determination to take it after 
he arrived at the jail. (Record, 44). 
Larry Bench interviewed Mr. Beck shortly after his 
arrival at the jail. (Record, 36-37, 59-60). Mr. Beck 
mentioned the breathalyzer to lk. Bench on several occasions, 
expressing disbelief that he could be charged with drunk 
driving without having taken a breathalyzer test. (Record, 
5 7). Mr. Bench had no reason to believe that :1r. Beck was 
refusing to take a breathalyzer test. Mr. Beck initiated 
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each conversation regarding the breath test. (Record, 37, 
58). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT CONSENTED TO A CHEM-
ICAL TEST BY OPERATION OF LAW 
Section 41-6-44.10, Utah Code Annotated, (1953 
amended) provides: 
"(a) Any person operating a motor 
vehicle in this state shall be deemed 
to have given his consent to a chemical 
test or tests of his breath, blood, 
or urine for the purpose of deter-
mining whether he was driving or in 
actual physicial control of a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol, any drug, or combination of 
alcohol and any drug, and provided 
that such test is or tests are admin-
istered at the direction of a peace 
officer having grounds to believe such 
person to have been driving or in act-
ual physicial control of a motor veh-
icle while under the influence of al-
cohol, any drug, or combination of 
alcohol and any drug .... " (Italics 
added). 
Clearly under Utah law, a valid consent to a c)1~:i1 ic 
-6-
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test exists solely by virtue of the oneration of a motor 
vehicle by the individual within this State. No further 
consent need legally be given, and a test may be adminis-
tered based upon the "Implied Consent Law" unless that 
imnlied consent is specifically revoked. Hyde v. Darius, 
549 P.2d 451 (1976). 
POINT II 
APPCLLANT DID NOT EXPRESSLY REFUSE TO 
SUBMIT TO A CHEMICAL TEST, THUS REVOK--
ING THE LEGALLY OPERATIVE CONSENT AND 
MAKING APPLICABLE THE FURTHER PROVIS-
IONS OF SECTION 41-6-44.10 (b) 
Section 41-6-44.lO(b) provides: 
"If such person has been placed under 
arrest and has thereafter been reques-
ted by a peace officer to submit to 
any one or more of the chemical tests 
provided for in sub-section (a) of this 
section and refuses to submit to such chemi-
c-oz test m• tests, such person shall be 
warned bv a peace officer requesting the 
test or ·tests that a refusal to submit 
to the test or tests can result in re-
vocation of his license to operate a 
motor vehicle. FollowiI1g this warning, 
unless such person immediately requests 
the chemical test or tests as offered by 
o neacc oJ~1'icer be administered, no test 
shall be given .... " (italics supplied). 
A condition precedent to the operation of the warning 
provisions of the statute and that the person request a test is a 
refusal. Thus. unless the individual refuses to submit to such 
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chemical test, the rest of the section is not applicable. 
This Court has clearly set forth the requirements 
of a refusal in Hyde v. Dori us, supra. Hyde was arrested for 
driving under the influence and, when asked to submit to a 
chemical test, replied that she wouldn't listen and that the 
police did not know what they were talking about. A period 
of approximately five (5) minutes elapsed between her arrest 
and her alleged refusal. This Court, recognizing the efficacy 
of the implied consent statute,stated: 
"Under the circumstances here, four or 
five minutes is not a reasonable time 
within which to eXPect asentient consent 
or refusal; particularly when the Court 
found that, at the scene, Plaintiff was 
upset, irritated and scared as a res-
ult of the accident and accompanying 
events." (italics added). 549 P. 2d at 
452. 
In this case, the record shows that Apuellantwas 
irritated, upset and hostile as a result of having to inter-
upt his dinner with his wife, leave her at the restaura:it, 
and return to the motel to get their checkbook, and having 
been arrested en route to the motel when he felt that it 
was unjustified. Appellants words and conduct clearly in-
dicate an uncertainty and can by no means be construed to 
be an express refusal. The record shows no indication that 
Officer ,1ark advised the Appellant that he considered his 
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silence or uncertainty to be a refusal. The Appellant 
believed that he had the right to make a final deter-
mination at the jail to the chemist and, that a refusal, 
if given, would have to be expressed by him in writing. 
The determinative statement by this Court on 
the issue of refusal is still that which was set forth 
in Hyde v. Dori us, supra. There, the Court adopted the 
language of the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Bock, 
328 P.2d 1065 (Idaho, 1958): 
"By operating a motor vehicle in this 
state the defendant is 'deemed to have 
given his consent to a chemical test.' 
The only way that he can withdraw that 
consent is to expressly refuse the test. 
So under our law if he neither refuses 
nor consents, expressly, the test may 
be made." 328 P.2d at 1072-73 
This Court also sited Idaho law in Hyde v. Dorius, 
.'upra, for the purpose of determing what constitutes express 
refusal. Mills v. Swanson, 460 P.2d 704 (Idaho, 1969) in-
volved a situation where Swanson had remained silent when 
requested to take the test. The Trial Court found that 
silence was insufficient to constitute a refusal, and the 
Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. The Court concluded, 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"In the case at bar, the respondent 
did not at any time expressly refuse to 
take the test. Expressly means indirect 
or unmistakable terms. Expressly means 
declared and not merely left to impli-
cation. Thus where an individual has 
neither refused or consented, but for 
some reason within the discretion of 
the officer, the test is not adminis-
tered, it cannot be said that there 
was an express refusal to take the 
test. 460 P.2d at 705 (citations 
omitted). 
It was clearly by implication only that Officer Mark con-
eluded that Mr. Beck refused to take the test. At no ticc 
was the test physicially offered to the Appellant. In 
addition, Mr. Beck had a misunderstanding of Utah law, re-
lating to the administration of the chemical test a11d the 
manner of an actual refusal. All of this occurred withi~ 
short period of time. Hunter v. Dori us, 23 Utah 2d 122, 458 
P. 2d 877 (1969) recognized that an individual has a "reason-
able length of time in which to make up his mind" and to 
consult counsel. 
The 1977 Amendment to the Statute provides that 
there shall be no right to consult an attorney "for the 
purpose of determining whether to submit to a chemical te~t 
or tests." 41-6-44. lO(g), Utah Code Annotated, (1953, as 
amended). The Statute on its face, thus contemplates 2 de 
_ 1 n _ 
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mination whether to submit. It does not require the 
determination to be immediate or without contemplation. 
Sub-section (b) of the Statute does require an immediate 
request by the accused to take the test but only in the event 
of a p1-ieceedin~ refus-::.:. No such refusal is present in this 
case. 
The holdings of Gassman v. Dori us, 543 P. 2ci 197 
(1975) and Elliott v. Dorius, 557P.2d 759 (1976) show that 
a subjective understanding of the situation by the accused 
person is necessary -::o justify a finding of refusal. 
Gassman held that warning given approximately an hour and 
fifteen minutes prior to the officer's request for the test 
did not comply with the Statute. Elliott held that a con-
temporaneouswarning did comply. The only logical assumption 
from these two cases is that the Court recognized the impor-
tance of a subjective understanding of the situation by the 
accused as a basis for finding a refusal. 
The Court below specifically found that Appellant 
had a misconception regarding the law. (Record, 23-24). 
In Calver v. State, 519 P.2d 341 (Colo. 1974), the Color-
ado Supreme Court, interpretating Statute similar to Utah's, 
held that a refusal to take a chemical test based upon a mis-
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rnderstanding is not a refusal within the statutory 
meeting, and, therefore, no basis for revocation. 
See also West v. DMV, 80 Cal. Reptr. 385 (1969). 
Thus, even an express refusal may be invalidated 
because of a misunderstanding. TJhere, as in the 
instant case, the presence of a refusal is open 
to conjecture, the presence of a misunderstanding 
becomes even more important. 
Clearly, because of the implied consent law, 
the Appellant's consent existed at least until the time 
of his arrest. After booking, his conduct and words in-
dicated that the consent was not revoked, since he inquire( 
about the breathalyzer test. The period between the arrest 
and booking shows no verbal refusal, and at the most, shows 
uncertainty over whether or not to submit. 
The 1977 Amendment did nothing to alter the law 
with regard to what constitutes a refusal. Therefore, 
the holding of Hyde v. Dori us, s;,ccr2, is controlling. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court below erred in finding that Appellant 
refused to submit to a chemical test and in affirming the 
revocation of his driver's license. The implied conscut 
-12-
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was never revoked and the test should have been adminis-
tered. Even if an actual refusal had been made, based 
upon a material misconception, it is invalid. 
The decision of the Third Judicial District Court 
should be reversed. 
Dated this (_'iJ' day of June, 1978. 
1" 
Respectfully submitted, 
LITTLEFIELD, RITEHEY & COOK 
Attorney for 
Appellant. 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2), true 
and correct copies of the foregoing Brief, this the Ggf-:. 
day of June, 1978, to Robert B. Hansen, Attorney General 
and Bruce M. Hale, Assistant Attorney General, 236 Utah 
State Capitol ~uilding, Salt 
-14- J 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
